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Abstract. We present a new notion of short identity-based multisignature scheme with message recovery. We propose a concrete identity-based
multisignature with message recovery scheme based on bilinear pairing
in which multiple signers can generate a constant size multisignature on
same message regardless of the number of signers. There is no requirement to transmit the original message to the verifier, since the original message can be recovered from the multisignature. Therefore, this
scheme minimizes the total length of the original message and the appended multisignature. The proposed scheme is proven to be existentially
unforgeable against adaptively chosen message attacks in the random oracle model under the assumption that the Computational Diffie-Hellman
problem is hard.
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Introduction

In networks with limited bandwidth and lightweight mobile devices, long digital
signatures will obviously be a drawback. Apart from shortening the signature
itself, the other effective approach for saving bandwidth is to eliminate the need
to transmit the signed original message for verifying a digital signature. In this
work, we consider on the latter approach.
Consider n different signers. In order to allow any subgroup of them to produce a joint signature on a message m and convince a verifier that each member
of the stated subgroup signed the message, two or more signers cooperate to
generate a single compact digital signature in a multisignature scheme. A single multisignature can greatly save communication costs instead of transmitting
several individual signatures. To verify the validity of a multisignature, one still
needs public keys of all signers. In most applications these public keys will have
to be transmitted along with the multisignature. In this case, it partially defeats
the primary purpose of using a multisignature scheme, namely to save bandwidth. But the inclusion of some information that uniquely identifies the signers
?
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seems inevitable for verification. Fortunately, in an identity-based setting, this
information can be represented in a more succinct way.
An identity-based signature scheme allows any pair of users to verify each
other’s signatures without exchanging public key certificates. It resembles an
ideal mail system: If you know somebody’s name and address you can send him
messages that only he can read, and you can verify the signatures that only he
could have produced. Compared to the public key of the signer is essentially
a random bit string picked from a given set in traditional public key signature
algorithms, in the identity-based scenario, the public key of a signer is simply his
identity such as his name, email or IP address. The associated private key can
only be computed by a trusted Private Key Generator (PKG) using a master
secret. It can avoid using certificates which is a big burden to bandwidth in the
verifing process of a signature. These features make the identity-based concept
particularly appealing for use in conjunction with multisignatures.
When bandwidth is at a premium, another potential problem is that the
combined length of the original message and the signature is too large. Signature
schemes with total or partial message recovery provide a solution to this problem
by embedding all or part of the message within the signature itself. That is, the
message does not need to be hashed or sent along with the signature, which
saves storage space and communication bandwidth.
Our Contributions. For the first time, this paper presents a provably secure
(existentially unforgeable against adaptively chosen message attacks) identitybased multisignature with message recovery scheme based on bilinear pairing under the Computational Diffie-Hellman assumption in the random oracle model.
Because the original message can be recovered from the multisignature, there is
no need to transmit the original message to the verifier. This scheme minimizes
the total length of the original message and the multisignature. We also present
a concrete analysis of the reduction to prove the security of the proposed multisignature scheme. More precisely, we can show that if there is an attacker who
can forge a valid multisignature to pass the verification, then the Computational
Diffie-Hellman problem is solved.
Paper Organization. The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In Section
2, we introduce some related works that have been studied in the literature.
In Section 3, we introduce some prelinimaries used throughout this paper. In
Section 4, we propose a notion of identity-based multisignature with message
recovery scheme and present a concrete scheme based on bilinear pairing. We
also present a security model and security proof of our scheme in this section.
Section 5 concludes the paper.

2

Related Works

In 1984, Shamir introduced the notion of identity-based cryptography to simplify
key management of certificate-based public key infrastructures and proposed an
identity-based signature scheme [13]. Since then several practical identity-based
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signature schemes have been devised [4, 6, 3, 8]. Cha and Cheon [3] proposed an
identity-based signature scheme using gap Diffie-Hellman (GDH) groups, and
proved their scheme is secure against existential forgery on adaptively chosen
message and ID attack under the random oracle model. Hess [8] also proposed
an efficient identity-based signature scheme based on pairings. The security of
their scheme relies on the hardness of the Diffie-Hellman problem in the random
oracle model.
The notion of multisignatures was introduced by Itakura and Nakamura [9].
Several works on this topic have been done [2, 10, 12]. In [10], the first formalized
strong notion of security for multisignatures was proposed. They modified the
Schnorr-signature-based multisignature scheme originally proposed by Ohta and
Okamoto [12] and proved its security. Gangishetti et al. [5] presented identitybased serial and parallel multisignature schemes using bilinear pairings. Harn
and Ren [7] proposed an efficient RSA multisignature scheme based on Shamir’s
identity-based signature.
In order to minimize the total length of the original message and the appended signature, the message recovery schemes were introduced (e.g. [11]).
Zhang et al. [14] proposed an identity-based message recovery signatures scheme.
Their scheme can be regarded as the identity based version of Abe-Okamoto’s
scheme [1]. Their scheme was also extended to achieve an identity-based partial
message recovery signature scheme. Based on the scheme due to Zhang et al.
[14], we achieved the goal of minimizing the total length of the original message
and the appended multisignature in an identity-based setting.

3
3.1

Preliminaries
Bilinear Pairing

Let G1 , G01 be cyclic additive groups generated by P1 , P10 , respectively, whose
order are a prime q. Let G2 be a cyclic multiplicative group with the same order
q. We assume there is an isomorphism ψ : G01 → G1 such that ψ(P10 ) = P1 . Let
ê : G1 × G01 → G2 be a bilinear mapping with the following properties:
– Bilinearity: ê(aP, bQ) = ê(P, Q)ab for all P ∈ G1 , Q ∈ G01 , a, b ∈ Zq .
– Non-degeneracy: There exists P ∈ G1 , Q ∈ G01 such that ê(P, Q) 6= 1.
– Computability: There exists an efficient algorithm to compute ê(P, Q) for all
P ∈ G1 , Q ∈ G01 .
For simplicity, hereafter, we set G1 = G01 and P1 = P10 . We note that our
scheme can be easily modified for a general case, when G1 6= G01 .
3.2

CDH Problem

Let G1 and G2 be two groups of order the same prime order q. Let P be a
generator of G1 . Suppose there exists a bilinear map ê : G1 × G1 → G2 . Let A
be an attacker. A tries to solve the following problem: Given (P, aP, bP ) for
some unknown a, b ∈ Z∗q , compute abP .
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The success probability of A, which is polynomially bounded with a security
parameter l, is defined as
∗
SuccCDH
G1 ,A (l) = Pr[A(P, aP, bP, abP ) = 1; a, b ∈ Zq ]

The CDH problem is said to be intractable, if for every probabilistic polynomial time algorithm A, SuccCDH
G1 ,A (l) is negligible.

4
4.1

Identity-based Multisignature with Message Recovery
Definitions

In an identity-based multisignature with message recovery scheme, there is a
trusted party Private Key Generator (PKG). PKG is required to generate all
the users’ private keys.
There are three parties in the system, the PKG, the signer and the verifier.
The scheme is ideal for closed groups of users such as the executives of a multinational company or the branches of a large bank, since the headquarters of
the corporation can serve as a key generation center that everyone trusts. This
scheme consists of the following four algorithms.
Setup: PKG sets up its secret key s with respect to a security parameter q
as the master key of this scheme and publishes the corresponding public key
Ppub . PKG should generate related groups and point out the generator of these
groups. PKG also should describe which bilinear mapping and hash functions
will be used in this scheme and publish these public information to all interested
principals.
Extract: When a principal requires its private key SID corresponding its identity ID, this algorithm generates the private key using the master key and the
principal’s identity, and returns the private key to the principal.
Sign: This is an interactive algorithm. Several principals who got their private
keys from the Extract algorithm can firstly generate their individual signatures
(vi , r, Ui ) on a message m respectively, and one of them or other specified trusted
principal can generate a single compact multisignature (r, U ) on the message m
corresponding to these principals who participate in this algorithm.
Verify: On receiving a multisignature (r, U ) and several principal’s identities
ID1 , ID2 , · · · , IDn , this algorithm checks whether the multisignature is a valid
multisignature corresponding to these principal’s public keys. If the multisignature is checked as valid, the original message m can be recovered from this
multisignature.
4.2

Security Model

Boldyreva [2] defined the notion of security for multisignature as no valid multisignature should keep an honest player that part of the alleged subgroup accountable if it did not participate in signing. That is to say, no adversary can
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forge an alleged multisignature of some message corresponding to an alleged
subgroup of signers so that a verifier can check the multisignature as valid when
not all signers of the alleged subgroup did sign the message. In order to achieve
its goal, an adversary is allowed to corrupt players and send arbitrary messages
during multisignature generation process.
We use a similar definition of existential unforgeability against a chosen message attack of [2]. Our definition is strong enough to capture an adversary who
can simulate and observe the scheme. It is defined using the following game
between an adversary A and a challenger C.
Assume in a subgroup of n signers who want to participate in generating
a multisignature, there is only one honest signer. All other n − 1 members of
the subgroup have been corrupted by the adversary. This means the adversary
can get secret keys and public keys of corrupted signers. But the adversary only
knows the public key of the single honest signer. The adversary can paticipate in
the multisignature generation process on behalf of these n − 1 corrupted signers.
Its goal is to frame the honest signer.
Firstly, challenger C runs Setup algorithm to get the system’s master-key
s with respect to a security parameter l and sends the system’s public key
Ppub = sP and other public parameters {G1 , G2 , ê, q, P, H1 , H2 , F1 , F2 , k1 , k2 }
to adversary A.
A can access the following oracles to start an attack.
H1 Oracle: For each H1 hash query with respect to elements v1 , v2 , · · · , vn in
∗
G2 and a message
Qn m, C returns a hash value H1 (v) ∈R Zq corresponding to the
product v = i=1 vi of these elements v1 , v2 , · · · , vn .
H2 Oracle: For each H2 hash query with respect to an user IDi , C returns a
hash value QIDi ∈R G1 as the user IDi ’s public key.
Extract Oracle: For each Extract query with respect to a user IDi except for
the honest user ID∗ , C returns SIDi = sQIDi as the user’s private key, in which
the QIDi is the H2 hash value of the user IDi ’s identity.
Sign Oracle: For each Sign query on arbitrary message m with respect to a
subgroup of n signer’s identities ID1 , ID2 , · · · , IDn , this oracle can be divided
into two phases.
In the first phase, n − 1 signers generate their individual vi by randomly
selecting an element Ki from G1 and then computing vi = ê(Ki , P ). These n − 1
signers send their vi and a target signer’s identity IDt to C. C outputs a random
element vt ∈R G2 corresponding to the target signer IDt .
InQthe second phase, these n − 1 signers compute v using vt and all vi as
n−1
v = i=1 vi · vt . At the same time, C computes the same v using the same
method. These n − 1 signers generate and send their own individual signatures
(vi , r, Ui ) and message m to C. C returns a valid multisignature (r, U ) on message
m with respect to n signers include these n − 1 signers and the target signer.
Output: A outputs an alleged multisignature (r, U ) on a target message m∗
with respect to a subgroup of n signers ID1 , · · · , ID∗ , · · · , IDn in which includes
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an honest signer ID∗ who did not participate in the multisignature generation
process. If there was no Sign queries with respect to the target message m∗ and
a subgroup of signers in which includes the honest signer ID∗ have been queried
to Sign Oracle, and there was no Extract query with respect to the honest signer
ID∗ has been queried to Extract Oracle, A wins the game if the multisignature
(r, U ) can be verified as a valid multisignature.
If there is no such polynomial-time adversary that can forge a valid multisignature with respect to a subgroup of signers which includes an honest signer,
while the honest signer did not participate in the multisignature generation process in the game described above, we say that the multisigature scheme is secure
against existential forgery under chosen message attack.
The success probability of an adversary to win the game is defined by
U F −IDM M R−CM A
SuccA
(l).

We say that an identity-based multisignature with message recovery scheme is
existentially unforgeable under a chosen message attack if the success probability
of any polynomially bounded adversary in the above game is negligible. In other
words,
F −IDM M R−CM A
SuccU
(l) ≤ .
A
4.3

Proposed Scheme

Let G1 and G2 be two groups of the same prime order q. Let P be a generator
of G1 . Suppose there exists a bilinear map ê : G1 × G1 → G2 .
Setup: PKG chooses a random number s ∈ Z∗q and keeps it as the masterkey of this system. This master-key is known only by PKG itself. PKG sets
Ppub = sP as the system’s public key and publishes this public key and other
system parameters {G1 , G2 , ê, q, P, H1 , H2 , F1 , F2 , k1 , k2 }.
Here |q| = k1 + k2 . H1 : {0, 1}∗ → Z∗q , H2 : {0, 1}∗ → G∗1 , F1 : {0, 1}k2 →
{0, 1}k1 and F2 : {0, 1}k1 → {0, 1}k2 are four cryptographic hash functions.
Extract: A user submits his/her identity information IDi to PKG. PKG computes the user’s public key as QIDi = H2 (IDi ), and returns SIDi = sQIDi to
the user as his/her private key.
Sign: Let the message be m ∈ {0, 1}k2 .
Each signer randomly selects an element Ki in G1 and computes vi =
ê(Ki , P ). vi is broadcast to other signers.
Once each signer’s vi are available through the broadcast channel. They compute their individual signatures as follows:
v=

n
Y

n
X
vi = ê(K1 , P )ê(K2 , P ) · · · ê(Kn , P ) = ê(
Ki , P )

i=1

f = F1 (m)||(F2 (F1 (m)) ⊕ m)
r = H1 (v) + f
Ui = Ki − rSIDi

i=1

Identity-based Multisignature with Message Recovery
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In the above computation, the symbol || denotes concatenation of two operands.
Each signer transmits its individual signature (vi , r, Ui ) to the clerk who may
be one of these signers or other specified trusted principal.
Once the clerk receives an individual signature (vi , r, Ui ), he needs to verify
the validity of this individual signature. The verification procedure of the clerk
checks that
vi = ê(Ui , P )ê(QIDi , Ppub )r .
Once all individual signatures are received and verified by the clerk as valid,
the multisignature of message m with respect to these signers who generate these
individual signatures can be generated as (r, U ), where
U=

n
X

Ui =

i=1

n
X
i=1

Ki − r

n
X

SIDi

i=1

Verify: Given a multisignature (r, U ) and n signer’s identity ID1 , ID2 , · · · , IDn
who stated have signed a message, a verifier computes
n
X
r − H1 (ê(U, P )ê(
QIDi , Ppub )r ) = f
i=1

and
m = [f ]k2 ⊕ F2 ([f ]k1 ).
In the above computation, the subscript k2 of f denotes the least significant
k2 bits of f , and the superscript k1 of f denotes the most significant k1 bits of
f.
The verifier checks whether [f ]k1 = F1 (m) holds. If this equation holds, the
verifier accepts this multisignature and recovers the original message m from
this multisignature. Otherwise, the verifier rejects the multisignature.
4.4

Security Analysis

Theorem 1. This identity-based multisignature with message recovery scheme
is correct and sound.
Proof. The correctness of this identity-based multisignature with message recovery scheme can be shown as follows.
When the individual signature (vi , r, Ui ) is verified,
ê(Ui , P )ê(QIDi , Ppub )r
= ê(Ki − rSIDi , P )ê(QIDi , sP )r
= ê(Ki − rSIDi , P )ê(sQIDi , P )r
= ê(Ki − rSIDi , P )ê(SIDi , P )r
= ê(Ki − rSIDi , P )ê(rSIDi , P )
= ê(Ki , P )
= vi
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This means if the individual signature (vi , r, Ui ) is indeed generated by signer
IDi , the equation vi = ê(Ui , P )ê(QIDi , Ppub )r will always hold.
When the multisignature (r, U ) is verified, we can recover v which is used by
each signer in the multisignature generation from the following computation.
n
X
ê(U, P )ê(
QIDi , Ppub )r
i=1
n
n
n
X
X
X
= ê(
Ki − r
SIDi , P )ê(
QIDi , sP )r
i=1

i=1

i=1

n
n
n
X
X
X
= ê(
Ki − r
SIDi , P )ê(s
QIDi , P )r

= ê(

i=1

i=1

n
X

n
X

i=1
n
X

= ê(

i=1
n
X

= ê(

Ki − r

i=1
n
X
SIDi , P )ê(
SIDi , P )r

i=1

Ki − r

n
X

i=1
n
X

SIDi , P )ê(r

i=1

SIDi , P )

i=1

Ki , P )

i=1

=v
Then, using this v and part of the multisignature r, we can recover f from
the following computation.
r − H1 (ê(U, P )ê(

n
X

QIDi , Ppub )r )

i=1

= r − H1 (v)
= H1 (v) + f − H1 (v)
=f
Since f is computed from f = F1 (m)||(F2 (F1 (m))⊕m), we will try to recover
the original message m from f like this:
[f ]k2 ⊕ F2 ([f ]k1 )
= [F1 (m)||(F2 (F1 (m)) ⊕ m)]k2 ⊕ F2 ([F1 (m)||(F2 (F1 (m)) ⊕ m)]k1 )
= F2 (F1 (m)) ⊕ m ⊕ F2 (F1 (m))
=m
As previously declared, the subscript k2 and the superscript k1 of f denote
the least significant k2 and the most significant k1 bits of f respectively.
After recovering the alleged original message m, we need to check whether
[f ]k1 = F1 (m) to verify the validity of the multisignature. If this equation holds,
the multisignature (r, U ) is valid and the original message m is recovered. Otherwise, the multisignature (r, U ) is a forged one.
t
u
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Theorem 2. This identity-based multisignature with message recovery scheme
is existentially unforgeable under a chosen message attack in the random oracle
model, under the assumption that the Computational Diffie-Hellman problem is
hard.
Proof. Assume there is an algorithm A that can forge a multisignature under
a chosen message attack. There will be another algorithm B that can run the
algorithm A to solve the CDH problem.
In the process of B using A to solve the CDH problem, B needs to simulate
all the oracles that A can query as follows.
Setup: B sets up Ppub = aP as the system’s public key and sends Ppub and
other system parameters {G1 , G2 , ê, q, P, H1 , H2 , F1 , F2 , k1 , k2 } to adversary A.
In this case, B only knows the system’s public key is aP , but he does not know
the corresponding master-key s which is actually a in this concrete situation.
Two hash functions F1 , F2 of the four hash functions used in this scheme are
published as normal hash functions. The other two hash functions H1 , H2 are
both treated as random oracles.
H1 Queries: B creates and keeps two lists of tuples to simulate H1 Oracle. At
the beginning of the simulation, both of these lists are empty.
One list is called Hvn -List which is used to store tuples like
(v1 , v2 , · · · , vn , h).
In this type of tuples, the first n elements come from group G2 and the last
element comes from Z∗q .
After receiving a H1 hash query with respect to several elements v1 , v2 , · · · , vn
in G2 and a message m, if the first n elements v1 , v2 , · · · , vn are not as a record
in the v ∗ -List which is constructed in the Sign Oracle and not in a record in
this Q
Hvn -List, B randomly selects h ∈ Z∗q and returns h as the H1 hash value of
n
v = i=1 vi . Then, B records the tuple (v1 , v2 , · · · , vn , h) in this Hvn -List. If the
first n elements v1 , v2 , · · · , vn are already in a record in this Hvn -List, B only
returns the corresponding h in the record as the H1 hash value. All in all, this
list matches the situation that the honest signer is not required to participate in
the multisignature generation.
The other list is called Hv ∗ -List which is used to store tuples like
(m, v1 , v2 , · · · , vn−1 , v ∗ , y − f ).
In this type of tuples, the first element m is an arbitrary message to be signed
by a subgroup which includes the honest signer. The next n elements come from
group G2 and the last element comes from Z∗q .
After receiving an H1 hash query with respect to several elements v1 , v2 , · · · , v ∗
in G2 and a message m, if the first n elements v1 , v2 , · · · , vn−1 , v ∗ are as a record
in the v ∗ -List which is constructed in the Sign Oracle butQnot as a record in this
n−1
Hv ∗ -List, B returns y − f as the H1 hash value of v = i=1 vi · v ∗ in which y
is got from the corresponding record in the v ∗ -List and f is computed by the
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equation f = F1 (m)||(F2 (F1 (m)) ⊕ m) with respect to the message m. Then, B
records the tuple (m, v1 , v2 , · · · , vn−1 , v ∗ , y−f ) in this Hv ∗ -List. Note that for the
same n elements v1 , v2 , · · · , vn−1 , v ∗ but different message m, the value y is same
because it comes from the same record in the v ∗ -List, but the value f is different
because it is computed by the equation f = F1 (m)||(F2 (F1 (m)) ⊕ m) for diffenent message. So, the returned hash value y − f is different. In this case, we need
to add a new record in this Hv ∗ -List. If these elements m, v1 , v2 , · · · , vn−1 , v ∗ are
already in a record in this Hv ∗ -List, B only returns the corresponding y − f in
the record as the H1 hash value. In a word, this list matches the situation that
the honest signer is required to participate in the multisignature generation.
H2 Queries: B creates and keeps one list H2 -List to simulate H2 Oracle. At the
beginning of the simulation, this list is empty.
For each H2 hash query with respect to a signer IDi except for the honest
signer ID∗ , if IDi is not in a record in this H2 -List, B randomly selects ki ∈ Z∗q
and returns QIDi = ki P as the H2 hash value of IDi . Then, B records the tuple
(IDi , ki , QIDi ) in this H2 -List. If IDi is already in a record in this H2 -List, B
only returns the corresponding QIDi in the record as the H2 hash value.
For the H2 hash query with respect to the honest signer ID∗ , B returns
QID∗ = bP as the H2 hash value of ID∗ .
Extract Queries: B creates and keeps one list Ex-List to simulate Extract
Oracle. At the beginning of the simulation, this list is empty.
For each Extract query with respect to a signer IDi except for the honest
signer ID∗ , if IDi is not in a record in this Ex-List, B looks up the H2 -List
which is created by H2 Oracle to find the record about IDi . Because a signer
needs to query H2 Oracle prior to its any other operation, the Extract Oracle
can always find out the record with respect to IDi in the H2 -List. Using the ki
value in the record in the H2 -List with respect to IDi , B returns
SIDi = ki Ppub = ki aP = aki P = aQIDi
as the signer IDi ’s private key. Then, B records the tuple (IDi , SIDi ) in this ExList. If IDi is already in a record in this Ex-List, B only returns the corresponding
SIDi in the record as the signer IDi ’s private key.
Sign Queries: B creates and keeps two lists of tuples to simulate Sign Oracle.
At the beginning of the simulation, both of these lists vn -List and v ∗ -List are
empty. vn -List matches the situation that the honest signer is not required to
participate in the multisignature generation. v ∗ -List matches the situation that
the honest signer is required to participate in the multisignature generation.
Without loss of generality, we assume that the target signer is always the last
signer IDn .
For each Sign query with respect to an arbitrary message m and a subgroup
of n signers ID1 , ID2 , · · · , IDn , this oracle are divided into two phases.
In the first phase, n−1 signers ID1 , ID2 , · · · , IDn−1 generate their individual
vi = ê(Ki , P ) in which Ki is randomly selected from group G1 and send their vi
and the target signer’s identity IDn to B.
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If IDn is not the honest signer ID∗ , B can randomly select an element Kn
from group G1 and compute vn = ê(Kn , P ). B returns vn to A and records the
tuple
(v1 , v2 , · · · , vn−1 , vn , Kn )
in the vn -List.
If IDn is the honest signer ID∗ , B can randomly select two integers x, y ∈R
∗
Zq . Then B computes
v ∗ = ê(aP, bP )y · ê(P, P )x = ê((yab + x)P, P )
and returns this v ∗ to A. In this case, the corresponding random element from
group G1 is
K ∗ = (yab + x)P.
B records the tuple
(v1 , v2 , · · · , vn−1 , v ∗ , y, x)
in the v ∗ -List.
In the second phase, A computes f = F1 (m)||(F2 (F1 (m)) ⊕ m) with respect to message m. A queries H1 Oracle the H1 hash value with respect to
(v1 , v2 , · · · , vn−1 , vn ) or (v1 , v2 , · · · , vn−1 , v ∗ ) and message m and uses this H1
hash value to compute the second part of n − 1 signer’s individual signature
(vi , r, Ui ) as r = H1 (v) + f . A computes the third part
Ui = Ki − rSIDi = Ki − raQIDi
of n − 1 signer’s individual signatures by the real Sign algorithm using the previous r and the corresponding private key SIDi = aQIDi got from the Extract
Oracle and sends these n − 1 individual signatures and message m to B.
B needs to compute f = F1 (m)||(F2 (F1 (m)) ⊕ m) at first. If IDn is not
the honest signer ID∗ , B computes the individual signature (vn , r, Un ) by the
real Sign algorithm using the corresponding r which is computed the same as
previous
Pn process and SIDn which is got from Extract Oracle. Then, B computes
U = i=1 Ui and returns (r, U ) as the multisignature on message m with respect
to n signers ID1 , ID2 , · · · , IDn . In this case, both of the individual signature
(vn , r, Un ) of IDn and the multisignature (r, U ) can pass their own verification
process. These verifications can be checked by using the method in Theorem 4.1.
If IDn is the honest signer ID∗ , B computes r by using H1 Oracle as
r = H1 (v) + f = y − f + f = y,
and simulates the third part of the honest signer ID∗ ’s individual signature as
U ∗ = K ∗ − rSID∗ = (yab + x)P − y · abP = xP
in which the corresponding x can be found out in the v ∗ -List.
Then, B computes
n−1
X
U=
Ui + U ∗
i=1
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and returns (r, U ) as the multisignature on message m with respect to n signers
ID1 , ID2 , · · · , IDn−1 , ID∗ .
Verify: Both of the individual signature and the multisignature can pass the
verifications. The individual signature (v ∗ , r, U ∗ ) can pass the verification as
follows.
ê(U ∗ , P )ê(QID∗ , Ppub )r
= ê(xP, P )ê(bP, aP )y
= ê(xP, P )ê(yabP, P )
= ê((yab + x)P, P )
= v∗
The multisignature (r, U ) can also pass the verification as follows.
ê(U, P )ê(

n
X

QIDi , Ppub )r

i=1
n−1
X

= ê(

Ui + U ∗ , P )ê(

i=1
n−1
X

= ê(

= ê(

n−1
X

Ui , P )ê(U ∗ , P )ê(

= ê(

Ui , P )ê(

n−1
X

n−1
X

QIDi , aP )y ê(U ∗ , P )ê(QID∗ , aP )y

i=1

Ki − ya

i=1

= ê(

QIDi , aP )y ê(QID∗ , aP )y

i=1

i=1
n−1
X

QIDi + QID∗ , aP )y

i=1

i=1
n−1
X

n−1
X

n−1
X

QIDi , P )ê(ya

i=1

n−1
X

QIDi , P )ê(xP, P )ê(yabP, P )

i=1

Ki , P )ê((yab + x)P, P )

i=1

=

n−1
Y

vi · v ∗

i=1

Since we have assumed that adversary A can forge a multisignature under
a chosen message attack, after the simulation process above, A can output a
valid multisignature (r1 , U1 ) on message m with respect to a subgroup of n
signers which includes the honest signer ID∗ who did not participate in the
multisignature generation. There are two restrictions about this multisignature
generation. The first one is there is no query to Extract Oracle with respect
to the honest signer ID∗ . The second one is there is no query to Sign Oracle
with respect to the message m and a subgroup of signers which includes the
honest signer ID∗ . B can compute the third part U1∗ of the honest signer ID∗ ’s
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individual signature (vi∗ , r1∗ , U1∗ ) from the valid multisignature (r1 , U1 ) as follows.
U1∗

=U−

n−1
X

Ui

i=1

All these Ui come from A in the second phase of the Sign Query.
B can reset all the oracles and runs A for the second time. At the end of
the simulation, with a non-negligible probability B can get another different
individual signature (v2∗ , r2∗ , U2∗ ) on the same message m and with respect to
the same honest signer ID∗ when v1∗ equals to v2∗ . That means for two different
random integer pairs (x1 , y1 ) and (x2 , y2 ),
K1∗ = (y1 ab + x1 )P is equal to K2∗ = (y2 ab + x2 )P.
Both (r1∗ , U1∗ ) and (r2∗ , U2∗ ) can pass the verification process, and K1∗ equals
So,

K2∗ .

∗

∗

ê(U1∗ , P )ê(QID∗ , Ppub )r1 = ê(U2∗ , P )ê(QID∗ , Ppub )r2
ê(U1∗ + r1∗ SID∗ , P ) = ê(U2∗ + r2∗ SID∗ , P )
U1∗ + r1∗ SID∗ = U2∗ + r2∗ SID∗
(r1∗ − r2∗ )SID∗ = U2∗ − U1∗
SID∗ = (r1∗ − r2∗ )−1 (U2∗ − U1∗ )

In this case, B can compute the honest signer ID∗ ’s private key SID∗ when
he only knows the honest signer ID∗ ’s public key QID∗ and the system’s public
key Ppub . Because SID∗ is expressed as abP , QID∗ is expressed as bP , Ppub
is expressed as aP , B can solve an CDH problem if A is able to forge valid
multisignatures.
If there is no such polynomial-time adversary that can forge a valid multisignature corresponding to a subgroup of signers that include an honest signer,
we say that this identity-based mlutisigature with message recovery scheme is
secure against existential forgery under chosen message attack.
t
u

5

Conclusion

We proposed a new notion of short identity-based multisignature scheme. The
notion of short identity-based multisignature scheme can be viewed as identitybased multisignature with message recovery scheme. In order to sign short messages using a scheme that minimizes the total length of the original message and
the appended signature, we proposed an concrete identity-based multisignature
with message recovery scheme based on bilinear pairing in which multiple signers
can generate a constant size multisignature on same message regardless the number of signers and there is no need to transmit the original message to verifier,
because it can be recovered from the multisignature. We also proved that our
scheme is secure against existential forgery on adaptively chosen message attack
in the random oracle model, under the hardness assumption of CDH problem.
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